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External shocks, such as commodity price fluctuations, natural disasters, and the role of the 
international economy, are often blamed for the poor economic performance of low-income 
countries. This paper quantifies the impact of these different external shocks using a panel vector 
auto-regression approach and compares their relative contributions to output volatility in low-
income countries vis-a-vis internal factors. We find that external shocks can only explain a small 
fraction of the output variance of a typical low-income country. Internal factors are the main 
source of fluctuations. From a quantitative perspective, the output effect of external shocks is 
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Economic performance in low-income countries is highly unstable. During 1965 to 1997, the stan-
dard deviation of output growth and the frequency of drops in real GDP larger than 3 percent
were respectively two and ¯ve times larger in low-income countries than in high-income countries.
This larger volatility and prevalence of negative shocks can become especially burdensome for low-
income countries because of their low average growth rates and high fraction of population living
under poverty.
Among policymakers, external shocks, such as terms-of-trade °uctuations, international condi-
tions, natural disasters, or aid volatility, are often explicitly or implicitly blamed for this volatile
performance. Recent reports by the IMF, World Bank, and UNCTAD state that \exogenous shocks
... can have a signi¯cant negative impact on developing countries' growth, macroeconomic stability,
debt sustainability and poverty", \low-income countries are particularly vulnerable to natural dis-
asters, terms-of-trade shocks, and other adverse shocks", and that \the level and volatility of world
commodity prices are an important in°uence on economic growth and the incidence of poverty in
LDCs".2
The focus on external shocks is understandable given some structural characteristics of low-
income countries, particularly the importance of primary commodities on their exports, their higher
exposure to natural disasters, and their dependence on aid °ows.3 However, this simple list of
structural features does not prove that external shocks are important, either in absolute or relative
terms. Internal shocks resulting from con°icts, political instability, and economic mismanagement
are a potentially important source of economic volatility, as suggested by the ¯ndings of Acemoglu
et al. (2003) and Ahmed (2003). Also, the emphasis on external shocks seems to portray low-income
countries as simple bystanders whose economic ailments are the result of factors beyond the reach
of their policymakers, and gives a somewhat gloomy perspective of the prospects of these countries
to achieve a sustainable and stable economic performance without experiencing major changes in
2See IMF (2003), World Bank (2004) and Unctad (2002) respepctively.
3Primary commodities, whose prices are signi¯cantly more volatile than those of industrial goods, represent about
85 percent of low-income countries' exports, foreign aid represents about 11 percent of GDI for the average LIC, and,
according to a widely cited report by the World Bank (World Bank (2000)), between 1990-1998 94 percent of the
world's major disasters occurred in developing countries. This emphasis has also received some support from the
academic literature. For example, Easterly et al. (1993) state that: \shocks, especially those to terms of trade, play
a large role in explaining the variance of GDP".
1their productive structures. The issue therefore speaks to the quantitative e®ect of external shocks
and their relative importance vis-µ a-vis internal shocks.
This paper quanti¯es the impact of a comprehensive set of external shocks on the output and
income of low-income countries, and compares their relative ability to explain the large cyclical
°uctuations observed in these countries vis-µ a-vis internal factors. The external shocks considered
include terms-of-trade shocks, natural disasters, changes in the condition of the international econ-
omy and international interest rates, and °uctuations in aid °ows. By explicitly analyzing the
impact of each of these shocks, this paper not only addresses the question of the extent to which
the volatility of output in low-income countries can be attributed to external factors, but also which
of these factors are relatively more important.
The e®ect and relative importance of these di®erent shocks are determined using a vector auto-
regression (VAR) model in which external shocks are assumed to be exogenous to country-level
variables. This approach explicitly considers the dynamics of the di®erent variables, and therefore
allows us to estimate their impact at various frequencies. It also permit us to separate the fraction
of the variance of output that can be attributed to these external shocks from that portion that is
orthogonal to them and that we associate with internal factors because the broad set of exogenous
contingencies we consider covers most of the potential causes of external shocks for low-income
countries.
Because of the short time dimension of the series available, we use a panel VAR model in
which the dynamics of the countries in our sample are assumed identical (up to a country speci¯c
trend and constant) to increase the degrees of freedom of our estimation. The parameters of this
model are estimated on a sample of 40 countries classi¯ed as low-income by the World Bank, over
the period 1965-1997. A similar approach has previously been used by Deaton and Miller (1996)
to estimate the impact of commodity prices in African countries, Broda (2004) to estimate the
impact of terms-of-trade socks in countries with di®erent exchange regimes, and Ahmed (2003) to
determine the e®ect of di®erent sources of economic °uctuations in six Latin American countries.
The results of the paper show that, on the one hand, external shocks have an economically
meaningful impact on low-income countries' per-capita GDP, especially when compared with their
typical performance. A one standard deviation positive shock to either per-capita GDP of high-
income countries, commodity prices (our main measure of terms-of-trade), or per-capita aid °ows
2results in an approximately 1% signi¯cant increase in the per-capita GDP of low-income countries.
Climatic disasters (which include °oods, droughts, extreme temperatures, and wind storms) and
humanitarian disasters (which include famines and epidemics) result in declines in real per-capita
GDP of 2% and 4%, respectively. Real interest shocks and Geological disasters do not have a
signi¯cant impact on real activity. The impact of these external shocks on Gross Domestic Income
(GDI) is similar to their impact on GDP, with the exception of commodity price shocks, whose
e®ect on per-capita GDI doubles their e®ect on per-capita GDP. Although these magnitudes may
look modest in absolute value, they are signi¯cantly larger than the mean and median growth rates
of low-income countries during the last decade (0.2% and 0.4%, respectively).
On the other hand however, the results show that external shocks can account only for a small
fraction of the overall variance of real GDP in low-income countries. Even in the long run, they
cannot explain more than 11 percent of this variance. The remaining 89 percent is accounted
for by factors that are not within the broad set of exogenous shocks we consider, and which we
associate with endogenous shocks. Among the external shocks, changes in commodity price are the
most important exogenous source of °uctuations (explaining 37% of the 11 percent explained by all
external shocks), followed by aid shocks (25%), climatic disasters (14%), humanitarian crises (12%),
and °uctuations in the GDP of high-income countries and the international interest rate (10% and
3%, respectively). We perform an extensive robustness analysis and demonstrate that these ¯ndings
are very robust to changes in the details of the speci¯cation, identi¯cation assumptions, or sample
period.
It is important to mention that although we ¯nd that endogenous shocks are the most important
source of °uctuations, we do not make an attempt to disentangle the di®erent sources of these shocks
and their relative importance. The reason is that doing so would require us to make identi¯cation
assumptions about the contemporaneous causal order among the potentially important internal
variables, such as output, prices, government expenditure, and the monetary stance or the long-run
e®ect of shocks to some of these variables. We believe that this would be a dubious exercise given the
fact that, even for the case of the U.S., most empirical papers do not attempt a full decomposition
of the impact of these di®erent shocks and make only enough assumptions to identify the e®ect of
some limited set of innovations such as monetary policy or productivity shocks.
We also take advantage of our methodology to explore a series of additional questions regarding
3the impact of external shocks. Motivated by the policy debate about external shocks and debt
sustainability (see World Bank, 2003), we ¯rst look at the e®ect of external shocks on government
expenditure and the current account. We ¯nd that, in response to shocks, government expenditure
tends to move in tandem with total GDP. A negative shock thus reduces both real activity and
government expenditure. Interestingly, we ¯nd that in the case of natural disasters the decline of
government expenditure is proportionally smaller than the decline in output. This suggests that
governments try at least partially to compensate for the negative impact of these events. With
respect to the current account, the evidence suggests that it moves procyclically in response to ex-
ternal shocks. Low-income countries tend to borrow when facing favorable external conditions and
increase their foreign asset position during bad times. This behavior is similar to the procyclicality
of the current account documented for emerging markets (see Aguiar and Gopinath, 2004), and
goes against the conventional wisdom that poor countries get more indebted when facing adverse
external shocks.
The second issue we explore is the response of aid °ows to the di®erent external shocks, which
allow us to document, at least partially, the determinants of aid, and the relative importance of
supply and demand factors. We ¯nd that aid °ows increase signi¯cantly as a result of an increase
in the GDP of high-income countries, but decline as a result of increases on the commodity prices
faced by low-income countries and their output level. Interestingly, we do not ¯nd a signi¯cant
e®ect of natural disasters on aid °ows. Finally, we look at the impact of external shocks on di®erent
groups of low-income countries, separated by their degree of openness to trade, indebtedness, and
institutional quality. We document a larger impact of commodity price and interest rate shocks on
the output of low-income countries that are open to trade, which is consistent with the idea that
these countries are more exposed to international variables. However, we also show that the impact
of shocks, especially of commodity price shocks, is much shorter lived in open countries than in
closed ones. It seems therefore that the higher exposure is compensated with a quicker adjustment
to these types of shocks. We also ¯nd some support for the idea that highly indebted poor countries
(HIPC) are more vulnerable to external shocks. The response of these countries to the world
business cycle, commodity prices, and interest rate shocks is larger and more persistent than for
the rest of low-income countries. Regarding the role of institutions, we document that better
institutions seem to attenuate the impact of shocks to the world business cycle and commodity
4prices, but, contrary to the ¯ndings of Burnside and Dollar (2000), we do not ¯nd in this sample
a relationship between institutional quality and the impact of aid shocks.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature that have explored the link between
various external shocks and real activity in developing countries. The ¯rst one focuses on the role
of terms-of-trade shocks. Using growth regressions, recent papers by Collier and Gunning (1999),
Dehn (2001), and Collier and Dehn (2002) have documented an important e®ect of commodity price
shocks on growth (measured as a dummy variable that takes the value one if a shock occurs during
the period over which growth rates are computed and zero otherwise). Mendoza (1995), and Kose
and Riezman (1999) use instead calibrated general-equilibrium small-open-economy models and
¯nd that, compared with interest rates and productivity shocks, terms-of-trade shocks can explain
a large fraction (around 50 percent) of output °uctuations in low-income countries. More closely
related to the approach followed in this paper, Deaton and Miller (1996), and Ho®maister et al.
(1998) have used vector autoregressions (non-structural and structural, respectively) to estimate
the impact of terms-of-trade shocks on di®erent macroeconomic variables.4 They both ¯nd that
terms-of-trade shocks account only for a small fraction of output volatility. On a similar line, Broda
(2004) also uses a panel VAR approach and shows that terms-of-trade shocks have a larger impact
on real output in countries with ¯xed exchange rates. The role of the international business cycle
has been recently explored in a paper by Ahmed (2003), which looks at the relative contribution of
the performance of trading partners, international interest rates, and terms-of-trade shocks on the
variability of output in six emerging Latin American countries and ¯nds that these shocks account
for a small fraction of output volatility. A separate literature has looked at the economic impact of
natural disasters. Most of this literature is based on case studies and not on systematic econometric
evidence (see for example Albala-Bertrand, 1993; and Otero and Mart¶ ³, 1994). An exception is a
recent paper by Skidmore and Toya (2002), which use cross-country regressions to determine the
relation between the incidence of disasters (measured as the total number of disasters per land
area) and growth, and ¯nds a positive e®ect of climatic disasters and a negative e®ect (although
not always signi¯cant) of geological disasters.
This paper adds to this literature in several dimensions. First, by considering the impact of a
broad set of exogenous shocks in low-income countries in a uni¯ed framework, this paper provides
4Ho®maister et al. (1998) also includes international interest rates.
5a comprehensive picture of the overall contribution of external shocks to the unstable economic
performance of low-income countries, and of the relative importance of each type of shock. As
described above, the existing papers that focus on low-income countries had been concerned only
with the impact of terms-of-trade and interest rate shocks. Second, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the ¯rst paper to document the dynamic response of real activity to natural disasters and
aid shocks in a systematic way. Given the importance typically attributed to these shocks in low-
income countries, this is itself an important contribution. Third, this paper provides new evidence
on the determinants of aid °ows to low-income countries, the impact of di®erent external shocks
on government expenditure and debt, and the role of some structural characteristics on the impact
of shocks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the main stylized facts about
the incidence of external shocks in low-income countries and describes the measures and samples
that will be used in the analysis. Section 3 explains the methodological approach and discusses its
main assumptions. Section 4 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 5 reports on
the robustness of the analysis, and Section 6 discusses extensions. Section 7 concludes.
2 Stylized facts on external shocks in low-income countries
It is frequently claimed that the incidence of commodity price shocks and natural disasters is higher
in low-income countries than in high or middle-income countries (IMF, 2003). Their dependence in
foreign aid and foreign markets, and their typically high levels of indebtedness are also frequently
mentioned to argue that these countries are highly vulnerable to °uctuations in international con-
ditions. In this section we review some of the main stylized facts regarding the incidence of external
shocks in low-income countries and describe along the way the speci¯c variables that will be used
in the rest of the paper to capture these shocks.
The sample of countries to which we refer as low-income countries is shown in Table 1. The
sample includes 40 countries classi¯ed as low-income by the World Bank for which there is su±cient
coverage of all relevant measures of external shocks described below. The region with highest
presence in the sample is Sub-Saharan Africa with 32 countries, followed by South Asia with 4,
Latin America and the Caribbean with 3, and East Asia and Paci¯c with 1.
6The main variables used in the paper are the following. Real GDP per-capita corresponds to
the PPP adjusted measure and was obtained from the Penn World Tables (version 6.1). Commod-
ity price °uctuations are captured with the Deaton-Miller commodity-based terms-of-trade index
(henceforth DM index; see Deaton and Miller (1996)). The updated data for this index was ob-
tained from Dehn (2001). The broad terms-of-trade index corresponds to the ratio of export to
import prices computed using the current and constant price values of exports and imports from
the national accounts component of the Penn World Tables (version 6.1). Among these two mea-
sures of terms-of-trade, in the analysis we will focus on the DM index for two reasons. First, as
correctly pointed out by Aghion et al. (2005) broad terms-of-trade indexes capture °uctuations
in the exchange rate that are less arguably exogenous to the business cycles than °uctuations in
commodity prices. Second, from an empirical perspective, by using the DM index we give a better
chance to exogenous shocks to actually play a role because, as it will be shown later, this index
has a larger explanatory power for output °uctuations than the broader terms-of-trade index. Real
per capita aid °ows include the °ows of o±cial development assistance (ODA) and o±cial aid in
constant 1995 US dollars, and was obtained from the WDI. Aid as a fraction of Gross National
Income was also obtained from the WDI.
The variables capturing the incidence of natural disasters are non-standard and deserve further
discussion. Data for natural disasters was obtained from the Emergency Disasters Database (EM-
DAT) maintained by the Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). This is
a comprehensive database that includes data on the occurrence and e®ects of over 12,800 mass-
disasters in the world since 1900, compiled from a diversity of sources. As a general principle,
to enter into the database an event has to meet any of the following conditions: there are 10 or
more people reported killed; there are 100 or more people reported a®ected; a state of emergency is
declared; or there is a call for international assistance. Similarly to Skidmore and Toya (2002), we
classify disasters into three categories to increase the parsimony of the analysis. Geological disasters
include earthquakes, land slides, volcano eruptions, and tidal waves. An important characteristic of
this type of events is their unpredictability and relatively fast onset. The second category is Climatic
disasters. This category includes °oods, droughts, extreme temperatures, and wind storms (e.g.
hurricanes). Compared to the previous category, some of these disasters can be forecasted well in
advance (so precautions can be undertaken) and have a relatively long onset. The ¯nal category is
7what we label \Human disasters", and includes famines and epidemics. The main di®erence with
the previous two categories is that these types of disasters a®ect mainly human capital instead of
physical capital. For each category, we measure the incidence of disasters by counting the number of
events in a given year that classify as large disasters according to the following criteria established
by the International Monetary Fund (see IMF, 2003): the event a®ects at least half a percent of
a country's population, or causes damages of at least half a percent of national GDP, or results in
more than one fatality in every 10,000 people.
The di®erent columns of Table 1 show some summary statistics for each of these variables
across the sample countries (Panel A) and across income groups (Panel B). The table also shows
the sample period for which there is data available for each country, and the number of countries
included for each income group.
The comparison across income groups shown in Panel B reveals that, as it has been extensively
documented, low-income countries have grown slower and in a more unstable way than other
income groups. It also shows that commodity prices have declined on average for low-income
countries. Terms of trade have also declined on average, but the decline is not particular to
low-income countries. The volatility of commodity prices and terms of trade is however larger
in low-income countries than in other income groups. Given the relative importance of primary
commodities for low-income countries, the decline in commodity prices and their larger volatility
may be especially relevant: trade represents about 53 percent of low-income countries' GDP, and
commodities compose about 85 percent of their exports (compared with about 40 percent for high-
income countries), while the composition of their imports is not signi¯cantly di®erent from other
income groups. We also observe in the table that aid represents a much larger fraction of GNI in
low-income countries than in the rest of the world (see Column 8), which is not surprising because
of the limited access of LIC to private ¯nancial markets. Also, although Column 10 shows that aid
growth has been relatively stable among low-income countries, which is probably due to the fact
that the income classi¯cation is based on recent data and there has been limited mobility among
low-income countries in the world income distribution (see Jones, 1997), the same column makes
apparent the high absolute volatility of aid °ows. In fact, the standard deviation of the growth of
real aid °ows is one order of magnitude larger than its mean. Given the importance of aid °ows
for low-income countries documented in Column 8, this instability may be potentially harmful.
8Columns 11 to 13 in Table 1 show that, except for Geological disasters (which tend to be more
concentrated in middle income countries), natural disasters are indeed signi¯cantly more frequent
in low-income countries. Although this larger incidence may result from selection bias {an event
may be more likely to be classi¯ed as a large disaster if it occurs in a low-income country, which is
clearly a possibility given the criteria used by CRED and the IMF to classify disasters, this problem
is unlikely to a®ect our results for two reasons. First, our sample is composed exclusively of low-
income countries, and selection bias among low-income countries is less likely to be a signi¯cant
concern. Second, and most importantly, in our speci¯cation we will control for the average income
level of a country, and the identi¯cation will be provided mainly by the time variation of the data.
Selection bias will therefore be only a problem if the probability of registering an event in the
database is larger in a year with relatively low income with respect to each country's average. This
is clearly much less likely than having a relationship between a country's average income and the
probability of registering a disaster.
In addition to commodity price °uctuations, natural disasters, or aid °ows, low-income coun-
tries, like any small-open-economy, can be signi¯cantly a®ected by °uctuations on international
demand or credit market conditions. As mentioned above, exports of low-income countries tend
to be heavily concentrated on primary commodities, whose total demand is largely determined by
high-income countries. Also, low-income countries tend to be heavily indebted and dependent on
foreign capital, so they are potentially vulnerable to changes in international credit conditions.5
The variables we use to capture these potential sources of external shocks are the real GDP of
high-income countries, and the real international interest rate measured as the six-month LIBOR
in US dollars minus the change in the U.S. Producers' Price Index (PPI).6
5Changes in international interest rates may a®ect signi¯cantly the borrowing conditions faced by low-income
countries for two reasons. First, although the actual interest rates that low-income countries can obtain in private
international credit markets will of course be higher than the observed international market rates (e.g. LIBOR),
the evolution of these rates would be correlated as long as the country premium paid by LICs is not very cyclical.
Second, even if LIC obtain most of their ¯nancing from international ¯nancial institutions, for a given amount of
concessionality the rate obtained by these countries should move one to one with the rate at which IFIs can ¯nance
their portfolio. So, as long as the concessionality is not highly cyclical, the evolution of international interest rates
should be associated with the actual cost of borrowing
6It is not obvious ex-ante whether we should use a real or nominal interest rate. The choice of the real interest
rate was largely motivated by its widespread use in the existing literature (see Kose and Riezman, 2001; and Ahmed,
2003, among others). The main inconvenience is that the real interest rate tends to be much more procyclical than
the nominal interest rate. So, it is di±cult to disentangle its e®ect from the e®ect of the world business cycle. We
checked all the results using the nominal interest rate also and the conclusions of the paper are not a®ected, but the
role of the international business cycle (interest rate) is larger (smaller) in this case.
9The two panels of Figure 1, which plot the evolution of the growth rates of the GDP of high-
income countries, and the average DM index, terms-of-trade index, and real interest rate for low-
income countries, highlight the importance of considering the impact of shocks to aggregate demand
at the global level on low-income countries. Clearly, by omitting these factors one could wrongly
attribute the impact of aggregate demand °uctuations to commodity price shocks. This conclusion
would not be wrong from a reduced form viewpoint, but would be misleading in the sense that
commodity price °uctuations would be a proximate but not ultimate determinant of the variation
of output in LIC.
3 Estimating the impact of shocks in low-income countries
The impact of di®erent shocks on various aspects of a country's economic performance will be
estimated using a panel vector auto-regression (panel VAR). For a given country, our structural
model corresponds to:
A0xi;t = ®i + ¯it +
q X
j=1
Ajxi;t¡j + "it (1)
where xi;t = (z0
i;t;y0
i;t)0, z0
i;t = (GDPHt; DMTTi;t; Rt; GEOi;t; CLIMi;t; HUMi;t) is a vector of
exogenous variables including the (log) GDP of high-income countries (GDPH), the (log) real DM
commodity based terms-of-trade index (DMTT), the international interest rate (R), and three
indicator variables capturing the occurrence of geological, climatic, or human disasters (GEO,
CLIM, and HUM respectively), as described in the previous section; y0
i;t is a vector of \endogenous"
variables, which in our benchmark speci¯cation will correspond to y0
i;t = (AIDi;t; GDPi;t) , where
GDP is the (log) real GDP per capita (PPP adjusted) and AID is the (log) aid per capita. However,
the composition of the this vector will vary across speci¯cations, as we will replace GDP for the (log)
Gross Domestic Income per capita (GDI), include the di®erent components of GDP (Consumption,
Investment, etc.), or remove AID. In the notation that follows, GDP represents any of these
possibilities.
The main identi¯cation assumption of this paper is that the variables in z do not respond to
the y variables at any lags. This assumption is equivalent to imposing the following block diagonal
















where the size of the sub-matrices conforms with the dimensions of z and y. In terms of the
actual variables included within each group, this assumption implies that the terms of trade faced
by a low-income country, the GDP of rich countries, the incidence of natural disasters, and the
international interest rate are not a®ected by the present or past economic performance of any
particular low-income country, but all this variables probably have a contemporaneous and lagged
e®ect on this performance. Aid is included in the vector y because although foreign aid is not
determined by any particular LIC, the amount of aid °owing to a country likely responds to its
economic performance. Notice that by including aid among the y we are also assuming that the
amount of aid °owing to a particular country does not a®ect its terms of trade, the occurrence of
natural disasters or the conditions of the international economy, but all these variables do a®ect
the amount of aid a country is receiving.
Given that the prices of the commodities that constitute the main export products of LIC are
set in international markets, and that the economic performance of rich countries or the state of
the global ¯nancial markets are unlikely to be a®ected by the events occurring in any particular
poor country we believe these identi¯cation assumptions should not be controversial. Regarding
the occurrence of natural disasters, it might be argued that, given the manner in which these events
are recorded, the observation of a disaster could be correlated with a country's income. However,
as explained in the previous section, the identi¯cation of the parameters comes only from the time
dimension of the data, so the potential relation between a country's average income level and the
probability of registering a disaster is immaterial for our identi¯cation strategy.
Although the block-diagonality assumption permits us to identify the e®ect of the vector of
z variables on each y variable, identifying the impact of each z variable or the output e®ect of
aid shocks (which are part of the y vector) requires further assumptions. We ¯rst assume that
the occurrence of natural disasters is fully exogenous. That is, it is unrelated not only to the y
variables, but also to the rest of the z variables. For the rest of the z variables, we will follow the
standard practice of imposing a lower-triangular structure on the matrix of their contemporaneous
relations. In our benchmark case we assume that the contemporaneous causal order runs from
11the GDP of rich countries to the terms of trade faced by LIC and to the international interest
rate. This ordering permits the international interest rate to react contemporaneously to the
state of the global economy, but imposes that the feedback from the international interest rate
to global output operates only with a lag. As pointed out by Ahmed (2003), this assumption
is standard in studies of U.S. monetary policy that use quarterly or monthly data, but may be
overly strong when using annual data as in our case. Placing terms-of-trade below the GDP of
rich countries assumes that changes in the demand for commodities resulting from changes in the
state of the international economy translate into changes in the relative price of these products
contemporaneously, but changes in commodity prices a®ect rich countries' output only with a lag.
This assumption is also common in VAR studies of U.S. monetary policy that control for the price
puzzle by including indexes of commodity prices (see, for example, Christiano et al., 1998, and
references therein). The ordering of the terms-of-trade index and the international interest rate
also follows the typical ordering of commodity price indexes and interest rates in these studies.
Nevertheless, in the robustness section we will also determine the impact on the results of assuming
several alternative orderings among these variables. For the case of aid, we also impose a block
triangular structure in the matrix of contemporaneous relations between the y variables, A0
22, which
assumes that output responds contemporaneously to changes in aid, but aid °ows to a country
respond to changes in its economic conditions only after a year. Given the usual delays in the
process of aid allocation (see Odedokun, 2003), we believe that this is a sensible assumption.
The identi¯cation assumptions described above translate into the following structure for the



















































where m is the number of variables included in y excluding AID, and the size of the di®erent
sub-matrices conform with the dimension of the vectors that they multiply, as indicated by the
dimensions in subscript.
Several aspects of the model deserve further discussion. The vector yit is assumed to be trend
stationary. There is a longstanding debate in macroeconomics about whether macroeconomic
12variables are best represented as trend or ¯rst-di®erence stationary (see, for example, Nelson and
Plosser, 1982). Although in theory the hypothesis that the series is di®erence stationary can be
tested, it is widely recognized that those tests have very low power, particularly in small samples
(Enders, 2003). Also, although the long run properties of the alternative representations are very
di®erent, from a practical standpoint the short run forecasts obtained from them tend to be similar.
In our particular case, using the Levin et al. (2002) test for unit roots in panel data, we reject the
null hypothesis of a unit root for all the panel variables, GDP, DMTT, and AID, but standard
Dickey-Fuller tests cannot reject the hypothesis for the variables capturing the state of the world
business cycle (GDPH and R), which are common to all countries (the results of the unit root
test are reported in Table A1 in the appendix). However, for these common variables we cannot
take advantage of the cross-section dimension to increase the power of the tests, so we have only
31 observations. Given the low power of these test, and the small number of observations we prefer
to follow the results obtained for the panel variables and estimate the system assuming that the
series are trend stationary. Nevertheless, we will also estimate the model in ¯rst di®erences and
the results, reported in the robustness section of the paper, will prove qualitatively similar.7
The model corresponds to a panel VAR in which it is assumed that the dynamics, represented
by the A matrices, are common across cross-sectional units. This is a standard assumption in this
literature (see Broda, 2001, 2004; Ahmed, 2003; Uribe and Yue, 2003) because, given the length
of the time series dimension of the data (around 30 annual observations), it is not possible to
estimate country speci¯c dynamics unless we reduce importantly the number of exogenous shocks
under consideration, the number of lags, or both. However, as noticed by Pesaran and Smith
(1995), this assumption may lead to obtaining coe±cients that underestimate (overestimate) the
short (long) run impact of exogenous variables if the dynamics di®er importantly across countries.
There are several reasons that lead us to believe that this concern is unlikely to be important for
our results. First, we focus on a subset of relatively homogeneous countries, so the heterogeneity
of the parameters is likely to be much smaller than in studies that include countries from di®erent
income groups. Second, as Pesaran and Smith (1995) also notice, the asymptotic bias tends to zero
if the autoregressive coe±cient in the dependent variable (in this case GDP) is close to one, which
7Broda (2001, 2004) uses a similar approach to determine the e®ect of terms-of-trade °uctuations in countries
with di®erent exchange regimes. The main di®erence between his approach and ours is that he assumes the variables
are di®erence stationary and analyzes the VAR for the changes in the logs.
13will be the case in our model. Third, as demonstrated by Pakes and Griliches (1984), if di®erences
in slope coe±cients are uncorrelated with the exogenous variables the estimated parameters would
be consistent estimators of the average coe±cients. This is an important result, as we do not see a
particular reason to believe that the e®ect of say terms of trade in a country should be determined
by the level of terms of trade. Most likely, it will depend on idiosyncratic country characteristics.
Finally, this concern suggests that, if anything, we would be overestimating the long run e®ect of
the exogenous shocks, so their real role into explaining the unconditional variance of output would
be even smaller than suggested by our results.
Regarding the number of lags, standard lag selection tests place it between one and ¯ve de-
pending on the criteria used to punish the loss of degrees of freedom. We use an intermediate value
of 3 lags in our benchmark speci¯cation, which corresponds to the number of lags used by Deaton
and Miller (1996). As a robustness check, we also estimate the parameters of the model with one
and ¯ve lags, and, as it will be shown, the results would be largely una®ected.
Under the identi¯cation assumptions described above, the parameters of the model can be
estimated using a two-step procedure in which we ¯rst estimate by Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
(SUR) the parameters of each of the following systems of reduced form equations:
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i;t = (GDPHt; DMTTi;t; Rt). We then recover the impulse-response functions (IRF) to
each of the structural shocks (the ² in Eq. (1)) using these reduced form coe±cients and the
Cholesky decompositions of the corresponding variance-covariance matrices of errors. Notice that
given the assumption of full exogeneity, the variables capturing the occurrence of natural disasters
do not have a corresponding equation in the reduced form system. So, to estimate their contribution
in the variance decomposition we will use their empirical variance. This is equivalent to assuming
that the occurrence of a disaster is a random variable that follows a Bernoulli distribution with
the same probability across countries. We will relax this assumption by looking at the results in
di®erent sub-samples of countries with arguably di®erent ex-ante probabilities of being a®ected
by each type of disaster. The con¯dence bands for the IRF will be estimated by parametric
14bootstrapping assuming normally distributed reduced form errors.8
4 Results
4.1 The impact of external shocks on real activity
The dynamic response of output to the di®erent external shocks is depicted in Figure 2. The
di®erent panels of this ¯gure show the impulse-response functions (IRF) of (log) real GDP (GDP)
to the occurrence of Geological, Climatic, and Human disasters, and to one-standard-deviation
orthogonal shocks to the output of high-income countries (GDPH), the DM index (DMTT), the
international interest rate (R), and real per-capita aid (AID) under the benchmark identi¯cation
assumptions. As the model was estimated in logs, the IRF show the log deviations of real GDP with
respect to its baseline level, which contains a linear trend, so they can be interpreted as percentage
changes. The continuous line depicts the point estimate of the IRF, and the broken lines show the
90 percent con¯dence bands obtained from the empirical distribution as described above.
The ¯rst panel of Figure 2 shows that a one standard deviation shock to the output of high-
income countries (which corresponds to a 1 percent increase of GDPH with respect to its baseline
level) results in an almost immediate and statistically signi¯cant increase of 0.7 percent in GDP.
Notice that the response of GDP to GDPH is almost one to one, which indicates that output in
LIC is highly sensitive to °uctuations in the world business cycle. A similar but more protracted
impact is observed after a shock to commodity prices (Panel B). In this case the shock corresponds
to a 14 percent increase in commodity prices with respect to their baseline level and results in
a signi¯cant 0.9 percent increase in GDP after about four years. The impact of a shock to the
international real interest rate R (Panel C) is not statistically signi¯cant at any frequency, and
although the point estimate suggests a positive e®ect during the ¯rst three years, the underlying
magnitude is small (0.4 percent at the peak). This positive e®ect is not surprising given the positive
8The procedure can be brie°y described as °ollows: (i) we use the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the
reduced form errors to simulate a random realization of the perturbations; (ii) we use the initial values of the
di®erent variables, the baseline coe±cients, and the simulated perturbations to simulate a new set of observations for
the variables in the VAR; (iii) we use these simulated observations to estimate a new set of coe±cients; (iv) we repeat
this exercise 200 times (the procedure is much slower than standard montecarlo over the parameters but requires less
assumptions); (v) we compute the IRF for each set of coe±cients obtained from the bootstrapping; (vi) we build a
90 percent con¯dence interval for the IRF by taking the envelope of the 90 percent of the IRF that are closer to the
baseline IRF according to the euclidean norm.
15correlation between the real interest rate and the world business cycle.
Panels D to F show the dynamic response of output to each of the three classes of natural disas-
ters under consideration, Geological, Climatic, and Human. In these cases, the shock corresponds
to the variable indicating the occurrence of each of these disasters taking the value of 1 in year zero.
By de¯nition these events are not serially correlated, also, the identi¯cation assumptions imply that
they do not a®ect the commodity price index or the international variables, so the persistence of
the dynamic response is only due to the autocorrelation of output and aid. The ¯gures show that
Geological disasters have a small and non-signi¯cant impact on output. The lack of signi¯cance is
not surprising given that only eight countries in our sample experienced a geological disaster during
the sample period (see Table 1). On the contrary, the impact of Climatic and Human disasters is
large and statistically signi¯cant. A Climatic disaster results in a 2 percent decline in real output
one year after the event. In the case of a Human disaster, the decline is of 4 percent. Notice also
that the e®ect of a Human disaster is more persistent. According to the point estimates, the impact
of a climatic disaster has disappeared after 5 years, while the e®ect of a Human disaster dies out
only after year 10.
Panel G shows the impact of a shock to real per-capita aid on real per-capita GDP. We observe
that unexpected increases in aid have a clear positive impact on real output. A one-standard-
deviation shock to aid (which corresponds to a 30 percent increase) results in a signi¯cant 1 percent
increase in real GDP after three years. The ¯nal panel of Figure 2 presents the dynamic response
of GDP to its own innovation.
The dynamic responses of real per-capita GDI (real GDP corrected by terms-of-trade °uctua-
tions), which is our second measure of economic activity, to the di®erent external shocks is shown in
Figure 3. The reason to look at GDI as an alternative measure of activity is that a signi¯cant part
of the discussion on the importance of commodity price °uctuations on macroeconomic stability in
low-income countries is related to the impact of these price °uctuations on these countries' income
and their ability to honor their debt obligations or buy necessary imported capital goods. It is
apparent that the IRF reported in the di®erent panels of the Figure 3 are very similar to those
reported on Figure 2 with two exceptions. First, as expected, the impact of a commodity price
shock is larger and more protracted than before, reaching a peak of 1.6 percent four years after the
initial shock. Second, the aid shock induces an initial 1 percent decline in real GDI, which turns
16into a 0.5 percent increase in year 2. This pattern was also present in Panel G of Figure 2, but
in that case the initial negative e®ect was not signi¯cant, and the subsequent positive e®ect was
larger. A possible explanation for this pattern is that the initial increase in aid may trigger a real
appreciation of the local currency, which induces an initial decline in real GDI.
Overall, the dynamic responses shown in Figure 2 demonstrate that most external shocks have
a signi¯cant and correctly signed impact on real activity. The magnitudes of the e®ects lie between
1 and 5 percent of real per capita GDP at their peaks. These magnitudes are clearly economically
meaningful when compared with a one percent average trend in log real per-capita GDP among
the countries in the sample. Similar conclusions are obtained when looking at the impact of
these shocks on real per-capita GDI. However, the fact that external shocks have a real economic
impact that is economically signi¯cant does not necessarily mean that they are the main factor
behind the volatility of output in low-income countries. In the next section, we perform a variance
decomposition exercise to assess the relative importance of these shocks for output °uctuations.
4.2 Can external shocks account for the variance of output?
We perform a standard variance decomposition exercise for the variables contained in the VAR to
determine the ability of external shocks as a whole to explain GDP and GDI °uctuations at di®erent
horizons, and the relative importance of each di®erent shock. The results of this decomposition are
reported in the two panels of Table 2.
Panel A presents the variance decomposition of the forecast error of (log) GDP. The ¯rst two
columns of the table show the fraction of the one, ¯ve, and ten year ahead forecast error that can be
explained by all external shocks versus internal factors. For practical purposes, the variance of the
10 year ahead forecast error is almost identical to the unconditional variance of real GDP. So, this
row shows the fraction of the total variance of real GDP and GDI that can be accounted by each
type of shock.9 Columns 1 and 2 clearly show that external shocks can account for only a small
fraction of the variance of the forecast error at all horizons. Their relative importance, vis-µ a-vis
internal factors, increase with the forecast horizon, but even in the long run, they account for only
about 11 percent of the total output variance. The results suggest, therefore, that external shocks
are not the main factor driving °uctuations in real activity in low-income countries. Although their
9There is almost no change in the decomposition between the variance of the 10 and 20 year ahead forecast errors.
17impact is statistically and economically signi¯cant, internal factors are the ones that play the main
role.
The second half of the table (Columns 3 to 9) looks into the relative importance of each external
shock. The di®erent columns show the fraction of the variance of the forecast error of real GDP
explained by external shocks that can be accounted by the di®erent shocks included in this category.
The table shows that, in the short run, most of this variance (93 percent) can be explained by shocks
to international conditions (GDP of high-income countries and real interest rate), real aid °ows,
and Climatic disasters. In the long run however, commodity price shocks are the most important
exogenous source of °uctuations (37%), followed by aid shocks (25%), and climatic disasters (14%).
Geological disasters do not play a relevant role at any frequency.
Panel B shows the same variance decomposition exercise for the forecast error of real per capita
GDI. External shocks play a slightly more important role in this case, accounting for about 16
percent of the long run variance of real GDI, which is largely due to a much more important role
played by commodity price shocks, as it can be seen in the second half of the table. The overall
picture is however largely the same as in the case or real per capita GDP. It is internal factors the
ones that account for most of the variance of real activity.
5 Robustness
The results reported in the previous section were obtained under a series of assumptions regarding
identi¯cation, speci¯cation, choice of variables, etc. In this section we test the robustness of the
results to these speci¯c choices.
Table 3 summarizes the results of this robustness analysis. The di®erent panels of the table
report the results of the variance decomposition of the forecasting error of real GDP per capita
1, 5, and 10 years ahead. The ¯rst six panels show the results obtained for di®erent variations
of the benchmark speci¯cation. In the speci¯cation of Panel 1 we use only one lag instead of the
three used in the benchmark speci¯cation. In Panels 2 and 3 we change the order of the variables
in the exogenous block, which implies a change in the identi¯cation assumptions regarding the
contemporaneous causal order. In Panel 2 we put the commodity prices before the international
variables, and in Panel 3 we put it after both the real GDP of high-income countries and the
18international interest rate. In Panel 4 we assume that only the common component of commodity
prices (as captured by their average across LIC) a®ects the international variables (in the same order
as the benchmark speci¯cation), while in Panel 5 we assume that the commodity price indexes of
LIC do not have any e®ect on the international variables at any frequency. The speci¯cation in
Panel 6 is identical to the benchmark, except that real per capita aid °ows are not included in
the VAR. Panels 7 and 8 report the results obtained under the benchmark speci¯cation, but using
di®erent samples. In Panel 7 the sample includes only post-1973 data. The reason is to determine
whether there is any di®erence between the pre and post oil shock periods. Under a similar logic,
the sample used in Panel 8 includes only non oil exporter countries. The results shown in Panel
9 were obtained under the benchmark speci¯cation, but using the broad terms-of-trade measure
described in Section 2 instead of the Deaton-Miller terms-of-trade index. Finally, panels (10) and
(11) report the results obtained estimating the system in ¯rst di®erences instead of levels, and using
the Deaton-Miller and the broad terms-of-trade indexes respectively. In these last two cases, the
model did not include a trend.
The table clearly shows that the main results of the paper are extremely robust. Regardless
of the identi¯cation assumption, the details of the speci¯cation, or the speci¯c choice of variables,
external shocks are able to account only for a small fraction of the variance of output that never
exceeds 15 percent. In fact, if anything, the benchmark speci¯cation is among the most favorable
to external shocks as a source of °uctuations.
Including only one lag, as in Panel 1 reduces signi¯cantly the ability of external shocks to
account for output volatility.10 As expected, Panels 2 and 3 show that the ordering within the
exogenous block does not a®ect the importance of this group of variables as a whole. The relative
importance of commodity prices and international variables vary a little with the ordering, but the
overall ranking across exogenous shocks is not a®ected. The same is true for the results reported
in panels (4) and (5). Panel 6 shows that excluding aid °ows increases the relative importance of
the international variables. The fact that these variables now capture part of the impact of aid
shocks speaks to the correlation between aid °ows and the economic conditions of rich countries.
Interestingly, the results reported in Panel 8 show a decline in the relative importance of commodity
10Although not reported, the IRF obtained for this case strongly suggest that the model with one lag is misspeci¯ed,
as most of the series have not returned to their baseline level after 20 years.
19prices and an increase in the role played by interest rate in the short run, and aid °uctuations in
the long run during the post 1973 period. This suggests that at least part of the explanatory power
of commodity prices came from the ¯rst oil shock episode,11 but also that the relative importance
of international capital markets has increased in the last 25 years for this group of countries with
limited access to these markets. In the short run this manifests as a larger role of the international
real interest rate, while in the long run it manifests as an increased importance of aid °uctuations.
The reason is that, as we will document below, aid °ows are highly responsive to changes in the
international interest rate. The results obtained for the sample of non-oil exporters are very similar
to the benchmark, which is not surprising because the initial sample contained only 3 oil exporters
(Angola, Congo, and Nigeria). Panel 9 shows that using a broad terms-of-trade index instead of
the Deaton-Miller commodity price based index reduces the fraction of output variance explained
by the external shocks in 25 percent, and that this reduction is largely the result of the smaller
role of terms-of-trade shocks, even in the long run. This is somewhat surprising, as we may have
expected this broader index to capture a larger set of fundamental relative price shocks than those
re°ected in the DM index. However, the results suggest that, at least for this group of countries,
commodity prices are the main source of relevant relative price °uctuations. Finally, panels (10)
and (11) show that estimating the model assuming that the variables are ¯rst-di®erence-stationary
instead of trend-stationary does not make a signi¯cant di®erence in the ability of external shocks
to account for output volatility, independently of the speci¯c measure of terms of trade used in the
analysis,12 although the relative importance of the GDP of rich countries is larger in these cases.
These ¯ndings are in line with those of Ahmed (2003), who found that external shocks played a
small role explaining °uctuations in a group of six emerging markets (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela) using a speci¯cation in ¯rst di®erences.
11Similar results are obtained when dummies for the years of the di®erent oil shocks (1973, 1979, 1986, and 1990)
are included in the VAR.
12Of course, in this case the variance decomposition refers to the variance of the growth rates instead of the log
deviations from trend.
206 Extensions
6.1 External shocks, government expenditure, and debt
It is frequently claimed among policymakers that an important aspect of the link between external
shocks and economic performance in low-income countries results from the e®ect of these shocks
(specially commodity price shocks) on government expenditure, on a country's ability to serve its
debt obligations, and on its level of indebtedness. To explore this possibility we follow Deaton
and Miller (1996) and add to the vector of endogenous variables y the following variables: real
consumption (CONS), investment (INV ), and government expenditure (GOV ) (all real per capita
in logs). So, the vector y in equation (1), corresponds now to y = (GDP; CONS; INV; GOV )0:
We do not include net exports (NX) explicitly in the system because they can take negative values,
which would make the estimation in logs unfeasible. Notice that because of the exclusion of net
exports and the estimation in logs, there is not a trivial co-integration relationship among the
components of y: To recover the decomposition of output that we show in the IRF below we use
the average shares of each component in the sample, and compute net exports NX as a residual.13
The results of this exercise are reported in Figure 4, which shows the dynamic responses of
output, government expenditure, and the current account (net exports) to each of the exogenous
shocks. As, by de¯nition, the change in the current account is equal to the change in the capital
account plus the change in reserves, the evolution of net exports give us a sense of what is happening
with the net foreign position of a country.
The ¯gure shows that government expenditure usually moves in tandem with total output. So,
shocks that tend to increase real activity tend to increase government expenditure. To the extent
that government expenditure is used to provide valuable social services, the results suggest that
negative external shocks will a®ect the ability of the government to provide such services. Also, as
long as the increase in government expenditure is not purely ¯nanced with tax revenue, government
debt may increase as a result of a positive shock. Interestingly, the di®erent panels of Figure 4
show that, although government expenditure always moves in the same direction as total output,
the response of government expenditure to a shock vis-µ a-vis total output is much smaller in the
case of natural disasters. This ¯nding provides some evidence that government may try, at least
13The shares used in the ¯gure are 0.78 for consumption, 0.12 for investment, and 0.23 for government consumption.
21partially, to compensate for the negative impact of these disasters.
Regarding the impact of the di®erent shocks on the current account, the ¯gure suggests that,
with the exception of Geological disasters, the current account tends to go to surplus (de¯cit) as
a result of a negative (positive) shock, in other words, in this countries the current account is
countercyclical: they borrow in good times and \lend" (increase their position) in bad times. In
this regard, these countries do not seem to behave di®erently from emerging markets, which have
been documented to have a highly procyclical access to capital markets (see Agiar and Gopinath,
2004). It is important to keep in mind that the dynamic response of net exports was computed
as a residual from a linear approximation using the average shares of the other GDP components,
so it also captures inaccuracies in the approximation and in the shares used. However, given
the magnitudes observed in the IRFs, it is unlikely that the explicit consideration of these errors
could reverse the conclusion about the cyclicality of the current account. Overall, these ¯ndings
suggest that negative external shocks are not directly linked with signi¯cant increases in the level
of external debt of low-income countries. On the contrary, these countries seem to accumulate debt
while in good times. Of course, the results also imply that, during bad times, these countries are
not able to borrow, and most likely have to serve their debt obligations with a reduced level of
output and income. It is in this regard that negative external shocks may put these countries under
a lot of stress, but, as mentioned above, this situation is not di®erent from that experienced by
emerging markets, so, the evidence does not support any structural di®erence between these groups
of countries in this regard.
6.2 The determinants of aid
Much has been recently discussed on academic and policy circles about the adequacy of the level
of aid to low-income countries and its e®ectiveness (see for example, Burnside and Dollar, 2000;
Sachs et al., 2004; and Easterly et al., 2004). Despite this recent interest on the e®ects of aid, little
is known about the determinants of aid °ows.14 Here we provide some new evidence on this regard
by showing how aid °ows respond to the di®erent external shocks that a®ect low-income countries.
This can be seen in Figure 5.
The di®erent impulse-response functions reported in the ¯gure show that both, supply and
14Some recent papers exploring this issue include Neumeyer (2003) and Odedokun and Round (2003).
22demand factors a®ect the °ows of aid to low-income countries. On the supply side, Panel 1 shows
that a one-percent-increase in GDPH (one standard deviation shock) induces a signi¯cant 4 percent
increase in AID: On the demand side, Panels 2 and 7 show that both, an improvement on the
commodity prices and a positive endogenous shock, result in a decline in aid °ows. Surprisingly,
aid °ows do not seem to respond signi¯cantly to the occurrence of natural disasters. A Geological
disaster seems to be associated, if anything, with a decline in aid °ows. Climatic disasters do not
seem to a®ect these °ows, and only in the case of human disasters we observe a large positive,
albeit not statistically signi¯cant, reaction of aid °ows.
Table 4 presents the variance decomposition of the forecast error of log real per-capita aid at
di®erent horizons. Similarly to the case of real GDP per-capita, the table shows that most of the
variance of aid is accounted for its own shock. This seems to indicate that most of the variability
of aid is the result of purely idiosyncratic reasons unrelated to the state of the world economy or
the economic performance of the targeted countries. Among the determinants of aid, the intuition
suggested by the IRF is con¯rmed; the state of the world economy (output and real interest rates)
and changes in a country's commodity prices are the most important observable determinants of
aid °ows. The incidence of natural disasters and the performance of the target countries do not
play large role (except for an unusually large role of Geological disasters in the short run).
6.3 Openness, Indebtedness, and Institutions
Our analysis so far has assumed that the impact of external shocks is identical across low-income
countries. Of course, this assumption can be challenged on a number of grounds. In particular,
it is reasonable to think that, even among low-income countries, the impact of external shocks
depends on speci¯c country characteristics. In this section, we brie°y explore the role of three such
characteristics: the level of trade openness, indebtedness, and the quality of institutions. We do not
consider other characteristics that are likely to be important, such as the level of ¯nancial openness
(as measured by the openness of the capital account) or the degree of local ¯nancial development
because of their limited variation within our sample.15 Still, the variability of the characteristics
15The interquartile range of variation of the Chinn and Ito (2002) measure of capital account openness lies between
-1.1 and -0.05, compared with -1.1 and 1.2 for the whole sample of countries for which the measure is available. In
the case of the measures of local ¯nancial development, the interquartile range of variation of private credit as a
fraction of GDP lies only between 7 and 22 percent. In fact, the 90th percentile starts at only 30 percent. This
limited variation makes this sample uninteresting for the exploration of these issues.
23considered is still limited in our sample, so we should in principle not expect large di®erences
among groups of countries. Also, we estimate the impact of each characteristic separately to keep
the number of parameters and degrees of freedom at bay. Although existing studies have also not
considered a full set of interactions (see Broda, 2004, for an example) using this stepwise analysis
we cannot be completely sure that the di®erential e®ects associated with a particular characteristic
are not actually due to a di®erent characteristic that is correlated with it. Nevertheless, as it will
be shown below, some suggestive di®erences emerge that indicate that some speci¯c factors may
a®ect a country's vulnerability to external shocks and seem to con¯rm some of the intuition on the
role of these characteristics.
By increasing the relative importance of trade as a fraction of GDP, trade openness can make a
country more vulnerable to °uctuations in the international demand or prices of its main products.
It also may reduce the degree of import substitution, exposing countries to °uctuations in the
international prices of its main import products and reducing the degree of diversi¯cation. We
explore the impact of openness on the dynamic response of output to external shocks by interacting
with an indicator variable (that takes the value 1 if a country is open in a given year) all the
variables on the right hand side of the output equation of the benchmark speci¯cation (the last
equation in the system represented by equation (1)). The dummy variable is constructed using the
liberalization dates compiled by Sachs and Warner (1995) and extended by Wacziarg and Welch
(2003). The results of this exercise are reported in Figure 6, which compares the dynamic responses
of the real per capita GDP of open and closed low-income countries to each external shock. In
general, trade openness does not seem to a®ect much the dynamic response of output to external
shocks, and only three interesting di®erences emerge. First, the initial impact of commodity price
shocks is larger in open low-income countries, which is consistent with a higher exposure resulting
from the higher relative importance of trade in these countries, but their persistence is shorter than
in closed low-income countries. This di®erence in persistence seems to indicate that, although less
exposed initially, closed economies probably lack appropriate mechanisms to deal with the impact
of these shocks. Second, the impact of a shock to the international real interest rate is larger in open
economies, which is consistent with these economies being more synchronized with the international
business cycle. Finally, an aid shock seems to have a larger impact on closed economies, suggesting
that aid °ows play a larger role on countries that are only partially integrated with the rest of the
24world. Overall, these dynamic responses provide suggestive evidence that is consistent with some
of the expected e®ects of trade openness on a country's vulnerability to external shocks.
Highly indebted poor countries (HIPC) are often considered to be especially vulnerable to the
e®ect of exogenous shocks (see IMF, 2002). The intuition is that the need to serve a large stock of
debt reduces considerably the ability of these countries to smooth the impact of a negative shock
that simultaneously reduces revenue and increases the pressure for countercyclical ¯scal policy. To
study the di®erential impact of shocks on HIPC we add to our main speci¯cation the interaction
between a dummy variable that indicates whether a country belongs to the HIPC group and the
rest of the variables in the system. Importantly, we do this for the two equations corresponding to
the lower block of the system only (AID; and GDP). That is, we assume that only the dynamic
responses of aid and output are di®erent in HIPC countries. The dynamic responses of output to
the di®erent external shocks in HIPC and non-HIPC low-income countries are compared in Figure
7. The most remarkable feature of this ¯gure is that it shows that the response of output to the
world business cycle, commodity price, and interest rate shocks is larger and more persistent in
HIPC countries (which represent 76 percent of the observations). Interestingly, the impact of aid
shocks is not larger among these countries. The results therefore seem to con¯rm then that the
impact of exogenous shocks is larger in HIPC countries.16
The importance of institutions for output volatility has also been a source of recent debate
(see Rodrick, 1999; Acemoglu et al. 2002, and Raddatz, forthcoming; among others). According
to this literature, countries with good institutions are better able to deal with the distributional
consequences of exogenous shocks and also tend to follow more sound macroeconomic policies when
facing exogenous contingencies. At a more general level, a better institutional environment may
provide the ground for the development of complex contract arrangements that deal with the un-
certainty associated with these shocks. We attempt to address this issue by comparing the dynamic
responses to shocks of countries with institutions above and below the sample median (according
to their average rule of law indicator). Admittedly, our sample o®ers limited variation on the in-
16Of course, our simple speci¯cation is not able to control for possible reverse causality problems. It may well be
argued that countries become highly indebted precisely because the impact of exogenous shocks is larger. However,
addressing this type of endogenous ampli¯cation is beyond the scope of this paper and, to the best of our knowledge,
it has not even been treated in the panel time-series literature. The procedure we have used is standard in the
literature (see Broda, 2002), and the relationship between the HIPC category and the responses is correct, at least
from a reduced form perspective.
25dicators of institutional quality, as most countries included tend to lie below the world average.
Nevertheless, this problem stacks the cards against ¯nding any interesting di®erences across this
dimension. As in the previous cases, we add a series of interaction terms to the benchmark speci¯-
cation to allow the dynamic response of output and aid °ows to shocks to vary across countries with
law and order indicators above and below the median. The reason to allow aid °ows to vary across
levels of institutional quality is the recent emphasis of multilateral institutions as the World Bank
on measures of institutional quality to determine aid °ows (see Kraay, 2005), but similar results
are obtained when only the dynamics of output are allowed to vary across groups. The results are
reported in Figure 8. The ¯gure suggests that, at least in the case of shocks to the world business
cycle and commodity prices, the output e®ect is larger in countries with law and order indicators
below the median, but the reverse is true with respect to shocks to the international real interest
rate.17 Surprisingly, in this sample aid shocks do not seem to have a larger impact in countries
with relatively better institutions, which goes against the ¯ndings of Burnside and Dollar (2000).
Of course, as previously mentioned, the degree of institutional variation in our sample is smaller
than in Burnside and Dollar (2000), and also the speci¯c measure of institutions used is di®erent,
so the results are not directly comparable. In addition, the dynamic response presented in Panel
G corresponds to an aid shock that is orthogonal to changes in the world business cycle. As we
also ¯nd that countries with better institutions are more bene¯ted by an improvement in the world
business cycle, and that aid °ows are positively correlated with this cycle, one way of reconciling
our ¯ndings with Burnside and Dollar's is that their result shows, in reduced form, that countries
with better institutions are better able to take advantage of positive international conditions.
Summing up, the results shown in this section suggest that some speci¯c country characteristics
can play a role in the ampli¯cation of the impact of external shocks, and give partial support to
some of the hypothesis that have been raised regarding the role of some of these characteristics.
These results however have to be taken with caution because, as it is common in the literature,
the problem of endogeneity between the shape of the dynamic response and country characteristics
has not been addressed; because the di®erent characteristics have been considered in isolation, and
because of the limited variation in some of the characteristics analyzed.
17Geological disasters also appear to have a larger impact on countries with better institutions. We do not highlight
this result because the impact of geological disasters have never appeared signi¯cant in any speci¯cation.
267 Conclusion
This paper quanti¯ed the absolute and relative importance of a broad set of external shocks for
output °uctuations in low-income countries. In this respect, the main objective of this paper
has been to test whether the importance typically attributed to external shocks in policy circles
is actually borne out by the data. The general picture that emerges is that although external
shocks have economically meaningful e®ects on real activity, especially when compared with the
average economic performance of low-income countries, they account for only a small fraction of
the volatility of these countries' real GDP. The economic instability experienced by low-income
countries is therefore largely the result of internal factors.
Without further (and strong) identi¯cation assumptions, we can only speculate about what
are the most important internal causes of economic instability, but the episodes of in°ation, real
exchange overvaluation, and high levels of public de¯cit experienced by these countries suggest
that economic management is probably an important part of the story. However, the importance
of political instability and violent con°ict should not be overlooked within this sample. Although
identifying the separate role played by these di®erent internal factors is a di±cult task, the results
of this paper suggest that future research in that area may go a long way into understanding the
causes of instability in low-income countries.
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that the emphasis on external shocks as a source
of economic instability in low-income countries is misplaced. A standard criticism to previous stud-
ies that documented a small role for some external shocks, such as terms of trade and interest rate
°uctuations, was that they had left out some other important external sources of instability like
natural disasters and aid volatility. We have shown that, although these other sources of exoge-
nous shocks play a role and have important quantitative e®ects, their inclusion does not increase
signi¯cantly the role played by external shocks as a whole. Of course, this does not imply that
exogenous shocks should be completely disregarded. We have shown that large °uctuations in com-
modity prices and natural disasters have non-trivial quantitative e®ects that merit attention. But
the belief that the stabilization of exogenous shocks would signi¯cantly reduce the macroeconomic
volatility of these countries is not borne out by the data.
Another aspect of policy that is related to our results is that of insurance against external shocks.
27The large role played by internal factors implies that exogenous contingencies may have limited
power to smooth output °uctuations. Also, the importance of the state of the world economy
for the performance of these countries implies that there is a sizable fraction of the risk factors
that is uninsurable. Moreover, even without accounting for the correlation between commodity
price shocks and the state of the world economy, the high persistence of these shocks raises some
questions regarding whether the optimal response is insurance or adjustment. There is however an
alternative reading of the results. They also imply that, to a large extent, output °uctuations are
not determined by factors that countries cannot control without large changes in their productive
structures or their position in the international economy.
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Table 1: Sample of countries included in the analysis and summary statistics 
The table shows some summary statistics for each of the 40 low income countries included in the analysis (top panel) and compares them with other income groups 
(bottom panel). For each country (income group), column (1) shows the sample period used in the paper (number of countries included in each group); columns (2) and 
(3) show the average and standard deviation of the growth of real GDP (PPP adjusted) during the sample period; columns (4) to (7) present similar statistics for the 
Deaton-Miller commodity based terms of trade index (see Deaton and Miller (1996)) and the standard terms of trade index (ratio of exports and import prices from Penn-
World Tables 6.1); column (8) displays the average value of aid flows as a fraction of gross domestic income (from the World Bank WDI); columns (9) and (10) show the 
average and standard deviation of the growth rate of per-capita aid flows (in constant US$); columns(11) to (13) present the average number of Geological, Climatic, and 
Human disasters per year computed as the total number of each disaster divided by the number of years in the sample. Figures in the bottom panel correspond to the 
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Average 























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Angola 1985-1996 -0.028 0.160 -0.064 0.277 -0.022 0.202 6.466 0.116 0.410 0.000 0.333 0.000
Bangladesh 1971-1997 0.015 0.047 -0.037 0.218 -0.013 0.264 5.704 0.111 0.592 0.000 1.222 0.074
Benin 1965-1997 0.000 0.038 -0.014 0.168 -0.013 0.136 8.978 0.020 0.228 0.000 0.333 0.000
Burkina Faso 1965-1997 0.011 0.036 -0.011 0.178 0.004 0.128 11.007 0.054 0.171 0.000 0.303 0.091
Burundi 1965-1997 0.002 0.081 -0.015 0.256 -0.022 0.313 14.035 0.028 0.291 0.000 0.000 0.000
Cameroon 1965-1997 0.004 0.070 -0.010 0.108 -0.005 0.194 4.385 0.016 0.309 0.030 0.030 0.061
Central African Republic 1965-1997 -0.027 0.067 -0.014 0.234 -0.026 0.238 12.684 -0.013 0.262 0.000 0.061 0.000
Chad 1965-1997 -0.009 0.140 -0.013 0.191 -0.011 0.129 10.715 0.031 0.319 0.000 0.394 0.121
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1965-1997 -0.038 0.070 -0.014 0.154 -0.003 0.174 3.719 -0.024 0.326 0.000 0.061 0.000
Congo, Rep. 1965-1997 0.026 0.078 0.024 0.278 -0.019 0.188 8.117 0.025 0.458 0.030 0.030 0.000
Cote d'Ivoire 1965-1997 0.002 0.051 -0.035 0.116 -0.018 0.166 4.414 0.000 0.309 0.000 0.000 0.000
Ethiopia 1981-1997 -0.007 0.086 -0.011 0.199 0.003 0.208 10.686 0.038 0.283 0.000 0.588 0.235
Gambia, The 1966-1997 -0.001 0.034 0.000 0.201 -0.017 0.138 20.257 0.017 0.451 0.000 0.094 0.063
Ghana 1965-1997 0.013 0.072 -0.025 0.099 -0.010 0.182 5.679 0.034 0.350 0.000 0.061 0.030
Guinea 1986-1997 0.016 0.013 -0.033 0.199 -0.041 0.098 11.649 0.026 0.234 0.000 0.000 0.000
Guinea-Bissau 1973-1997 0.034 0.156 0.001 0.171 -0.020 0.190 44.628 0.354 1.212 0.000 0.000 0.120
Haiti 1967-1997 0.025 0.094 0.004 0.257 -0.002 0.166 7.648 0.084 0.423 0.000 0.323 0.032
Honduras 1965-1997 0.006 0.039 -0.005 0.128 -0.003 0.090 5.951 0.038 0.283 0.030 0.333 0.000
India 1965-1997 0.026 0.033 -0.014 0.086 -0.001 0.103 1.096 -0.029 0.297 0.030 1.030 0.000
Indonesia 1967-1997 0.049 0.019 0.007 0.185 0.058 0.146 1.986 -0.026 0.227 0.000 0.065 0.000
Kenya 1965-1997 0.013 0.059 -0.020 0.184 -0.004 0.097 7.045 0.001 0.267 0.000 0.212 0.030
Lesotho 1975-1997 0.014 0.065 -0.019 0.119 -0.021 0.126 12.346 0.008 0.129 0.000 0.217 0.000
Madagascar 1965-1997 -0.010 0.028 0.000 0.135 -0.014 0.084 7.807 0.030 0.257 0.000 0.606 0.000
Malawi 1965-1997 0.015 0.085 -0.012 0.099 -0.010 0.103 16.884 0.011 0.276 0.030 0.212 0.061
Mali 1967-1997 0.006 0.056 -0.014 0.189 -0.008 0.092 15.786 0.040 0.245 0.000 0.194 0.065
Mauritania 1965-1997 -0.010 0.075 -0.025 0.104 -0.005 0.119 21.206 0.048 0.430 0.000 0.303 0.061
Mozambique 1980-1997 -0.011 0.074 0.001 0.095 -0.063 0.113 31.929 0.105 0.405 0.000 0.611 0.167
Nepal 1965-1997 0.017 0.035 -0.027 0.198 0.002 0.035 6.949 0.054 0.217 0.091 0.182 0.000
Nicaragua 1965-1997 -0.024 0.067 -0.009 0.106 -0.025 0.229 14.590 0.057 0.455 0.091 0.273 0.000
Niger 1965-1997 -0.024 0.068 -0.002 0.165 0.008 0.168 11.646 0.041 0.278 0.000 0.242 0.121
Nigeria 1965-1997 -0.001 0.094 0.023 0.276 0.022 0.255 0.652 -0.023 0.420 0.000 0.061 0.000
Pakistan 1965-1997 0.030 0.030 -0.008 0.148 -0.025 0.159 3.522 -0.043 0.301 0.000 0.364 0.000
Rwanda 1965-1997 0.001 0.121 -0.007 0.202 0.023 0.267 16.449 0.030 0.358 0.000 0.091 0.030
Senegal 1965-1997 -0.004 0.053 -0.005 0.161 -0.011 0.085 10.979 0.012 0.264 0.000 0.212 0.000
Sierra Leone 1965-1996 -0.010 0.069 -0.023 0.144 -0.010 0.123 9.039 0.035 0.368 0.000 0.063 0.000
Tanzania 1988-1997 -0.015 0.065 -0.008 0.200 -0.023 0.048 21.275 -0.053 0.223 0.000 0.600 0.000
Togo 1965-1997 -0.004 0.092 -0.016 0.129 -0.019 0.289 10.351 0.009 0.283 0.000 0.091 0.061
Uganda 1982-1997 0.019 0.032 -0.033 0.268 -0.006 0.223 11.909 0.069 0.257 0.063 0.188 0.000
Zambia 1965-1997 -0.016 0.044 -0.026 0.196 -0.034 0.253 12.597 0.067 0.499 0.000 0.121 0.030
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Low 40 0.002 0.069 -0.010 0.171 -0.010 0.164 10.945 0.036 0.354 0.009 0.234 0.031
Middle 72 0.018 0.059 0.001 0.166 -0.001 0.115 7.304 0.050 0.649 0.018 0.129 0.005
High 30 0.029 0.031 -- -- -0.001 0.041 2.665 0.034 0.718 0.006 0.038 0.001
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Table 2: External shocks and Output Volatility 
In Panel A, columns (1) and (2) show the fraction of the variance of the forecast error of (log) real GDP per capita at various horizons that 
can be attributed to external versus and internal shocks respectively. Columns (3) to (9) show the relative contribution of each different 
external shocks to the total fraction presented in column (1). The different columns in Panel B show the same decomposition for the 


















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Real GDP
1 2 98 15.7 6.8 16.2 0.5 33.0 0.0 27.9
5 9 91 12.1 27.8 3.4 0.1 17.1 13.3 26.3
10 11 89 10.1 36.5 3.0 0.1 13.9 11.6 24.9
B. Real GDI (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 6 94 0.1 52.8 2.2 1.5 16.5 0.3 26.5
5 14 86 10.4 61.8 2.8 1.1 13.1 3.4 7.4
10 16 84 9.4 64.3 5 1 11.1 3 6.3
Forecast Horizon 
(years)
Fraction of the variance of 
the forecast error of 
explained by:
Fraction of the variance accounted for all external shocks that can be attributed to shocks 
to: 
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Table 3: Robustness 
The table shows the variance decomposition of the forecast error of real per capita GDP at 1, 5, and 10 year ahead for different 
specifications. Panel (1) shows the results obtained using the benchmark specification but allowing only one lag. Panels (2) and (3) reports 
the results obtained using a different ordering for the exogenous block that puts the DM terms of trade index first (last), followed 
(preceded) by the GDP of rich countries and the international interest rate. The specification reported in Panel (4) assumes that only the 
common component of the DM terms of trade affects the international variable, while in panel (5) we assume that there is no feedbak 
from the DM terms of trade index to the international variables. The results on Panel (6) and (7) use the benchmark specification but only 
data from the period after 1973 and excluding oild producer countries respectively. Panel (8) reports the results obtained when aid flows 
are not included in the system. The results in Panel (9) correspond to those obtained under the benchmark specification but using the 
broad terms of trade index instead of the DM commodity based terms of trade index. Panels (10) and (11) report results obtained using the 
benchmark identification assumptions but estimating the model in first differences instead of levels and using the DM index and the broad 



















1 1 99 43.6 1.1 5.8 0.5 16.8 2.6 29.6
5 2 98 31.7 37.7 6.6 0.1 14.5 3 6.4
10 4 97 20.1 43.8 17.7 0.1 9.3 2.2 6.7
1 2 98 13.8 8.7 16.2 0.5 33 0 27.9
5 9 91 9.6 30.2 3.4 0.1 17.1 13.3 26.3
10 11 89 8 38.6 3 0.1 13.9 11.6 24.9
1 2 98 15.7 8.1 15 0.5 33 0 27.9
5 9 91 12.1 27.8 3.4 0.1 17.1 13.3 26.3
10 11 89 10.1 36.6 2.8 0.1 13.9 11.6 24.9
1 2 98 16.1 7.1 13.9 0.5 33.8 0 28.6
5 10 90 10.6 35 2.5 0.1 15.6 12.1 24
10 12 88 9.1 42.9 2.1 0.1 12.6 10.6 22.6
1 2 98 15.7 8 16 0.5 32.5 0 27.5
5 9 91 12.8 25.5 3.7 0.1 17.5 13.6 26.9
10 11 89 10.6 34.6 3.2 0.1 14.2 11.9 25.5
1 2 98 23.7 4.3 25.4 1.6 45 0 --
5 7 93 17.2 30.9 6.4 0.4 25.1 19.9 --
10 8 92 14.4 41 5.7 0.3 20.3 18.2 --
1 2 98 11.8 5.8 33.2 0 33.6 0.4 15.1
5 9 91 6.5 8 5.5 1 12.6 7.6 58.7
10 11 89 14.5 7.2 5.8 0.9 10.2 6.1 55.2
1 2 98 11.8 0.5 16.5 1.1 34.2 0 36
5 9 92 7.3 27.6 3.8 0.8 21.6 16.3 22.7
10 9 91 6.8 33.5 3.4 0.8 19 15.8 20.7
1 3 97 11.9 12.5 24.9 0.4 25.2 0 25.1
5 7 93 17.4 8.8 12.5 0.4 18.9 21.4 20.6
10 8 93 16.5 11.3 14.7 0.4 17 21.5 18.7
1 3 97 18.7 5.9 18.5 3 18 0.3 35.5
5 7 93 22.4 11.1 13.2 1.9 19.8 4.2 27.4
10 7 93 23 11.3 13.2 1.9 19.5 4.1 26.9
1 4 96 17.3 12.4 18.5 1.7 16.1 0.3 33.7
5 7 93 21.2 14.6 14 1.3 18.1 3.8 26.9
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Table 4: Aid-volatility variance decomposition 
In Panel A, columns (1) and (2) show the fraction of the variance of the forecast error of (log) real per capita aid at various horizons that 
can be attributed to its own shock and all the rest of the shocks included in the system. Columns (3) to (9) show the relative contribution of 

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1 1 99 28.6 11.9 9.6 44 3.2 2.6 0
5 7 93 29.8 24.5 24.2 7.8 2.2 6 5.4
10 11 89 19.6 16.6 49.5 4.7 1.4 4.3 3.9
Forecast Horizon 
(years)
Fraction of the variance of  Fraction of the variance accounted for non-aid shocks that can be attributed to shocks to: 
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Table A1: Unit root tests 
Panel A reports the results of the Levin-Lin-Chu (2002) panel unit root tests for the panel variables used in the paper. In this panel, column 
(1) reports the coefficient obtained for the regression of orthogonalized residuals; columns (2) and (3) report the standard and modified t-
statistic associated with this coefficient. Column (4) reports the P-value for the null hypothesis that the series follows a unit root process. 
Column (5) reports the number of observations. The small number of observations compared with those in the paper results from the 
need to use a balanced panel to perform the test. Results are similar if countries that constraint the time series dimension are dropped from 
the sample. Column (5) indicates the maximum lag order used in the test. The test included country specific trends and constants. 
For the variables that are common to all countries, Panel B reports the results of standard Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests. The 
first column shows the ADF statistic; column (2) presents the corresponding p-value,; column (3) shows the number of observations, and 
column (4) indicates the number of lagged differences included in the test.. A constant and a trend were included in all ADF tests. 
A. Panel variables: Statistics for Levin-Lin-Chu unit root test
Variable Coefficient t-value t-star P-value Obs Lag trunc.
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
log real GDP per capita -0.689 -13.361 -7.599 0.000 320 6
log real DM index -0.898 -17.553 -10.911 0.000 320 6
log terms of trade -0.720 -16.117 -9.457 0.000 320 6
B. Common variables: Statistics for Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test
Variable Z(t) P-value Obs Lags
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
log GDP per capita rich countries -2.951 0.146 31 1
log real interest rate -2.560 0.299 31 1
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Figure 1: Rich-countries’ GDP, average DM index, terms of trade, and real interest 
rate 
Rich countries’ GDP is the GDP per capita of high income OECD countries expressed in 1995 US$. The DM 
index is the Deaton-Miller commodity based terms of trade index, terms of trade is the ratio of exports to import 
prices from Penn World Tables 6.1. The international real interest rate corresponds to the nominal six month 
LIBOR offer rate in US dollars deflated by the change in the US Producer’s Price Index. All growth rates 
correspond to the change in the log of the different variables. The three series have been demeaned and 
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Figure 2: External shocks and real activity 
The different panels of the figure exhibit the impulse-response functions of log real GDP per capita to different external shocks. Panel A shows the IRF to a one 
standard deviation shock to the log real GDP per capita of high income OECD countries. Panel B shows the IRF of log GDP to a one standard deviation shock 
to the process followed by the log Deaton Miller commodity based terms of trade index (DM index). Panel C presents the IRF to a one standard deviation to the 
log six month nominal LIBOR  rate. Panels D to F show the IRF to a Geological, Climatic, and Humanitarian disasters respectively. Panel G presents the IRF to a 
one standard deviation shock to per-capita aid flows. Panel H shows the IRF of output to its own innovation. The time horizon is in years. Each panel plots the 
estimated IRF (dark lines) and the corresponding empirical 80 percent confidence interval (broken lines) computed by non-parameteric bootstrapping. 
A. Shock to rich countries GDP  B. Shock to DM commodity prices index
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Figure 2 continued 
 
E. Climatic Disaster F. Human Disaster
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Figure 3: External shocks and Gross Domestic Income 
The different panels of the figure exhibit the impulse-response functions of log real GDI per capita to different external shocks. Panel A shows the IRF to a one 
standard deviation shock to the log real GDP per capita of high income OECD countries. Panel B shows the IRF of log GDP to a one standard deviation shock 
to the process followed by the log Deaton Miller commodity based terms of trade index (DM index). Panel C presents the IRF to a one standard deviation to the 
log six month nominal LIBOR  rate. Panels D to F show the IRF to a Geological, Climatic, and Humanitarian disasters respectively. Panel G presents the IRF to 
a one standard deviation shock to per-capita aid flows. The time horizon is in years. Each panel plots the estimated IRF (dark lines) and the corresponding 
empirical 80 percent confidence interval (broken lines) computed by non-parameteric bootstrapping. 
A. Shock to rich countries GDP  B. Shock to DM commodity prices index
C. Shock to international interest rates D. Geological Disaster
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Figure 3 continued 
E. Climatic Disaster F. Human Disaster
G. Shock to per capita aid flows























































































































































  43 
 
Figure 4: External shocks, Government Expenditure and the Current Account 
The different panels of the figure exhibit the impulse-response functions of log real GDI per capita, Government expenditure, and Net Exports to different 
external shocks. Panel A shows the IRF to a one standard deviation shock to the log real GDP per capita of high income OECD countries. Panel B shows the 
IRF of log GDP to a one standard deviation shock to the process followed by the log Deaton Miller commodity based terms of trade index (DM index). Panel 
C presents the IRF to a one standard deviation to the log six month nominal LIBOR  rate. Panels D to F show the IRF to a Geological, Climatic, and 
Humanitarian disasters respectively. Panel G presents the IRF to a one standard deviation shock to per-capita aid flows. The time horizon is in years.  
A. Shock to rich countries GDP  B. Shock to DM commodity prices index
C. Shock to international interest rates D. Geological Disaster
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Figure 4 continued 
E. Climatic Disaster F. Human Disaster
G. Shock to per capita aid flows
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Figure 5: The determinants of Aid 
The different panels of the figure exhibit the impulse-response functions of log real per capita Aid flows to different external shocks. Panel A shows the IRF to 
a one standard deviation shock to the log real GDP per capita of high income OECD countries. Panel B shows the IRF of log GDP to a one standard 
deviation shock to the process followed by the log Deaton Miller commodity based terms of trade index (DM index). Panel C presents the IRF to a one 
standard deviation to the log six month nominal LIBOR  rate. Panels D to F show the IRF to a Geological, Climatic, and Humanitarian disasters respectively. 
Panel G presents the IRF to a one standard deviation shock to real per-capita GDP. The time horizon is in years.  
A. Shock to rich countries GDP  B. Shock to DM commodity prices index
C. Shock to international interest rates D. Geological Disaster
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Figure 5 continued 
E. Climatic Disaster F. Human Disaster
G. Shock to real per capita GDP
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Figure 6: External shocks in open and closed economies 
The different panels of the figure exhibit the impulse-response functions of log real per capita GDP to different external shocks in both open and closed 
economies. Panel A shows the IRF to a one standard deviation shock to the log real GDP per capita of high income OECD countries. Panel B shows the IRF 
of log GDP to a one standard deviation shock to the process followed by the log Deaton Miller commodity based terms of trade index (DM index). Panel C 
presents the IRF to a one standard deviation to the log six month nominal LIBOR  rate. Panels D to F show the IRF to a Geological, Climatic, and 
Humanitarian disasters respectively. Panel G presents the IRF to a one standard deviation shock to real per-capita aid flows. The time horizon is in years.  
A. Shock to rich countries GDP  B. Shock to DM commodity prices index
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Figure 6 continued 
E. Climatic Disaster F. Human Disaster










































































































































































  49 
 
Figure 7: External shocks in Highly Indebted Countries (HIPCs) 
The different panels of the figure compare the impulse-response functions of log real per capita GDP to different external shocks in Highly Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPCs) and the rest of low income countries. Panel A shows the IRF to a one standard deviation shock to the log real GDP per capita of high income 
OECD countries. Panel B shows the IRF of log GDP to a one standard deviation shock to the process followed by the log Deaton Miller commodity based 
terms of trade index (DM index). Panel C presents the IRF to a one standard deviation to the log six month nominal LIBOR  rate. Panels D to F show the IRF to 
a Geological, Climatic, and Humanitarian disasters respectively. Panel G presents the IRF to a one standard deviation shock to real per-capita aid flows. The time 
horizon is in years.  
A. Shock to rich countries GDP  B. Shock to DM commodity prices index
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Figure 7 continued 
E. Climatic Disaster F. Human Disaster
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Figure 8: External shocks and Institutions 
The different panels of the figure compare the impulse-response functions of log real per capita GDP to different external shocks in low income countries with 
indicators of law and order above and below the group median. Panel A shows the IRF to a one standard deviation shock to the log real GDP per capita of high 
income OECD countries. Panel B shows the IRF of log GDP to a one standard deviation shock to the process followed by the log Deaton Miller commodity 
based terms of trade index (DM index). Panel C presents the IRF to a one standard deviation to the log six month nominal LIBOR  rate. Panels D to F show the 
IRF to a Geological, Climatic, and Humanitarian disasters respectively. Panel G presents the IRF to a one standard deviation shock to real per-capita aid flows. 
The time horizon is in years.  
A. Shock to rich countries GDP  B. Shock to DM commodity prices index
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Figure 8 continued 
E. Climatic Disaster F. Human Disaster
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